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ANGELA CHAVEZ et al.,
v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-~:E:ffect of Release or Compromise.The effect of Lab. Code, §
that "No release of
liability or
agreement is valid unless it is approved
by the [Industrial Aceident]
a panel, commissioner, or referee," is to make every compromise invalid until
it is approved, and a ruling of the commission disapproving a
compromise reached by an employee, suffering an industrial
injury, and the employer's insurance carrier two days before
the employee died of a nonindustrial heart condition could not
be disturbed where the commission, at the time the compromise
was before it for approval or disapproval, knew of the employee's intervening death, which death would normally terminate any right to disability payments. (Lab. Code, § 4700.)

PROCEEDING to review orders of the Industrial Accident
Commission awarding benefits and disapproving a compromise.
A ward affirmed.
Levy, Russell & DeRoy and George DeRoy for Petitioners.
Everett A. Corten, Edward A. Sarkisian, Talbot & Thompson and George Thompson for Respondents.
SPENCE, J.-Petitioners, who are the surviving widow and
children of Jose Chavez, seek annulment of the respondent
commission's award to them of certain benefits and of the
commission's order disapproving a compromise.
The employee, Jose Chavez, suffered an industrial injury
in 1955. His employer furnished medical treatment and made
temporary disability payments for approximately three
months. Thereafter, the employee filed an application for
adjustment of compensation, and the commission conducted
a hearing on February 27, 1956. An oral agreement of
compromise for $2,250 was reached by the employee and the
employer's insurance carrier on the following day.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 58; Am.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 389 et seq.
McK. Dig. Reference: (1] Workmen's Compensation, § 70.
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The insurer
a written
form supplied
the commission and sent it to the employee,
1956. It was received by the
who executed it on March
insurer on March 14. On March
however, the employee
died of a nonindustrial heart condition. 'l'he carrier signed
the
and forwarded it to the commission for
approval before
of the
's death. The commission, through its
of the death and at
the insurer's
'l'he order
stated, in part, that the ''Commission, having eonsidered the
entire reeord, now finds that it is not for the best interests
of the parties to approve ... [the) Compromise and Release
and that it should be disapproved, applicant having died
prior to approval thereof. . . . " The findings and award
simply reiterated that the death was the basis for such action.
The widow and dependent children were granted benefits consisting principally of unpaid compensation payments which
were found to have accrued in favor of the employee prior
to his death. Their petition for reconsideration was thereafter
denied.
The employee's dependents contend that although the employee died, there was still adequate consideration to support
the compromise. [1] While this may be true, it is not
controlling on the question of the effectiveness of the unapproved compromise or the question of the propriety of thE>
commission's refusal to approve it in view of section 5001 of
the Labor Code. That section provides: "Compensation is
the measure of the responsibility which the employer has
assumed for injuries or deaths which occur to employees in
his employment when subject to this division. No release of
liability or compromise agreement is valicl unless it is approved
by the commission, a panel, commiss,ioner, or referee." (Em·
phasis added.)
Undoubtedly the Legislature, in enacting this section, was
primarily concerned with protecting workmen who might agree
to unfortunate compromises because of economic pressure or
lack of competent advice. (See 1 Hanna, The IJaW of Employee Injuries and Workmen'" Compensation, p. 154.) However, the effect of the section,
itR clear wordinft, is to make
every compromise invalid until it is approved. (Employee's
Credit Co. v. Industn'al Ace.
177 Cal. 46 [169 P. 1001];
Massachusetts etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 176 Cal 488
r168 P 1050].) In conformity with the section, the written
compromise agreement here contained an express provision
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of the
by the commission, therefore,
clearly essc'ntial to its effectiveness. At the time that
was before the commission for approval or
the commission knew of the employee's interdeath, which death would normally terminate any right
§ 4700.) Under these
of the commission disapproving the
compromise cannot be disturbed.
The award made by the commission and the order disapproving the compromise are affirmed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
'l'his case comes to us on a petition to review an order of the
Industrial Accident Commission (hereinafter called the commission) disapproving a compromise agreement made between
an employee and employer. The majority correctly notes that
a eompromise agreement to be valid must be approved by the
eommission, and absent this approval the agreement is invalid
(Lab. Code, § 5001). From this proposition the majority
coneludes that where there is a disapproval of a compromise
agreement by the commission there is nothing for an appellate
court to review and the order of disapproval will not be
disturbed. In reaching such conelusion the majority avoids
the very question we were asked to review : Were the grounds
stated by the commission in disapproving the compromise
erroneous as a matter of law and thereby in excess of jurisdiction?
At the outset there is the preliminary question of whether
an order by the commission disapproving a compromise agreement is subject to review at all, and if so, does its scope include
the question we are here asked to review. Aceording to the
provisions of section 5950 of the Labor Code, any person
affected by an order of the commission may apply to the
courts for a writ of review. It is clear that an order approving
or disapproving a compromise and release comes within the
provisions of section 5950 and a writ of review is available
to a person adversely affected by such order (see Silva v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 68 Cal.App. 510, 515 [229 P. 870] ).
However, in reviewing an order of the commission disapproving a compromise and release, appellate courts will
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not annul it in the absence of an abuse of discretion (Stegeman
v. Industrial Ace.
6 Calif.
Cases 256; Dubendorf
v. Industrial Ace.
7 Calif.
Cases 191). To state
an appellate court's authority in this connection in terms of
the statute defining the scope of review (Lab. Code, § 5952),
questions of law are open to court review on the ground that
an erroneous ruling on matters of law is in excess of jurisdiction
National Atdo. etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
80 Cal.App.2d 769, 772 [182 P.2d 634] ). Therefore, the
question presented by petitioners, and which is now before
us, is a proper one for review.
The sole issue, then, is whether the grounds stated by the
commission in denying petitioners' application for reconsideration are erroneous as a matter of law. I refer specifically to
the application for reconsideration, since that is, in essence,
the final order and the one which we are reviewing. (See Lab.
Code, § 5901; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
15 Calif. Comp. Cases, 226.)
The pertinent parts of the commission's order denying the
application for reconsideration revealing the grounds are as
follows: "While it appears that the amount offered in settlement constituted a compromise of defendants' [employer and
insurance carrier] liability for any additional temporary disability indemnity, yet it appears that the main portion of
the settlement sum was a compromise of liability for permanent disability. Since death terminates disability (Lab.
Code, § 4700) it would appear that the consideration for the
settlement for permanent disability residuals had in a large
part failed upon the employee's death. It is true that the
parties had entered into an executed contract as between themselves but the Compromise and Release would not become
effective unless and until approved by this Commission. A
party to a contract may rescind if the consideration fails in a
material respect for any cause (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. 4)
and it thus appears that a party may rescind a contract otherwise valid, when the consideration in whole or in part fails
before the contract has been fully performed.
''The Panel is of the opinion that the referee acted correctly
in disapproving the Compromise and Release, upon defendants' notice of rescission thereof."
A reading of this order leaves no doubt but that the commission in affirming the referee's order disapproving the
compromise agreement and their denial of the application
for reconsideration was predicated upon the belief that there
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was a failm'd of
thus justifying the rescission
under section 1689, subdivision 4 of the Civil Code. Furthermore it is evident that there is no dispute concerning the facts,
.md hence this issue of whether or not the death of the employee constituted a failure of consideration is a question of
law and thereby a proper matter for review (see Reinert v.
lndnst1·ial Ace. Com., 46 Cal.2d 349, 358 [294 P.2d 713] ;
Winter v. lndustt·ial Ace. Com., 129 Cal.App.2d 174, 178
[276 P.2d 689]).
That the death of the employee did not constitute a failure
of consideration is clear. The survival of the employee, Chavez,
was not in any way a material part of the consideration in
the compromise agreement. Consideration is usually expressed
as the "bargained for exchange" (Rest., Contracts, § 75).
The compromise release states that Chavez released his rights
to any permanent disability payments in exchange for $2,250
he was to receive from his employer's insurance carrier; no
mention is made that the employer or his insurance carrier is
expecting Chavez to survive for any particular length of time.
The employer and insurance carrier were obviously bargaining
for this release; the whole object of the compromise was to
obtain Chavez' release of his rights arising from the injury,
anything else would have been pointless. In addition it is
reasonable to assume that both parties were aware that if
Chavez died his right to any disability payments would cease,
and hence contracting with this in mind, the employer assumed
the risk that Chavez might die before his period of permanent
disability ran out. The fact that Chavez died before the right
to any permanent disability payments accrued, did not affect
the fact that he released the right to receive payments had
he lived. The employer got exactly what he bargained for:
Chavez releasing his claims against the employer arising from
his injury.
Having established that the grounds on which the commission based its order were incorrect as a matter of law, the
order should be annulled and the cause remanded for appropriate commission action.
This conclusion is not affected, as the majority opinion
appears to imply, by the fact that the compromise agreement
was not approved by the commission at the time of death of
the employee Chavez. In other words the parties to a compromise agreement which has been submitted to the commission
for approval cannot unilaterally rescind the agreement prior
to the commission's approval or disapproval. It is true that
48c.ld-U
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section
states that the compromise agreement is not valid unless it is
the commission, but
this does not mean that the
is ineffective and either
is
to rescind it at will simply on the ground
that the
is not valid until approved. To state it
another way, the statute
a compromise not valid
unless the commission approves it not intended to afford a
ground for rescission once the
is submitted to the
commission. To
rescission on such basis would disrupt
the orderly administration of
and would be contrary
to the principles for the conservation of the time and energy
of the commission, and place each party at the caprice of the
other in that rescission might occur any time after submission
of the agreement to the commission but prior to the latter's
action. Obviously, the commission could not disapprove such
an agreement without legal or just cause. In other words
the commission may not validly act arbitrarily or do what
would amount to the same thing-base its conclusion on nonexistent facts or inapplicable rules of law. But this is just
what the commission has done in this case and the majority
here has approved its unauthorized action.
For the foregoing reasons I would annul the order.
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 19812. In Bank. Feb. 14, 1958.)

ARGONAUT INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Petitioner, v.
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and M.
FRANCES BELLINGER et al., Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Effect of Release or CompromiseApproval by Referee: Rehearing.-The Industrial Accident
Commission has authority to reconsider a referee's approval of
a compromise or release agreement. (Lab. Code, § 115, 5001,
5900-5911.)

[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, §58; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation, § 389 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 70, 212;
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 212; [3] Compromise and Settlement, § 8; Workmen's Compensation, § 70; [4] Workmen's Compensation,§§ 70, 212, 218; [5, 6] Workmen's Compensation, § 190;
[7, 8] Workmen's Compensation, §267; [9] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 272(5), 272(7).

